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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
VERNA R. SiMITH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 14519

ALBERT COON and TWENTIETH CENTURY
HOUSING, a Nevada corporation,
Defendants-Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING
AND SUPPORTING BREIF
PETITION FOR REHEARING
Twentieth Century Housing, defendant and respondent
herein, petitions the court for a rehearing on the following
grounds:
1.

The court's decision herein is improperly based on

the record of the lower court which was never filed herein
and therefore should not have been referred to*
2.

The decision of this court is not consistent with

its own precedent which holds that in cases on appeal where
no record is filed with the appellate court, the decision of
the lower court must be affirmed.
3.

The record of the lower court proceedings, if

available herein, would demonstrate that there were no
material issues of fact left unresolved.

4.

If the court herein is now going to reverse its

own precedent, respondent should be allowed to file the
record on appeal and submit an additional brief based on
that record, to demonstrate the validity of the lower court's
decision.
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
NATURE OF CASE
Plaintiff appellant sought judgment for breach of a
Uniform Real Estate Contract, possession of the subject real
property, treble damages, attorney's fees and costs.
Defendant-respondent, Twentieth Century Housing (hereinafter
referred to as TCH) counterclaimed for an order requiring
plaintiff-appellant to accept defendant-respondent's payments
and to submit an accounting of all sums received pursuant to
the Uniform Real Estate Contract, damages for abuse of
process, attorney's fees and costs.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT AND ON APPEAL
The trial court rendered judgment on the parties' cross
motions for summary judgment in defendant-respondents'
favor, except for the awarding of $30.55 to appellant, as is
more particularly stated in respondent's prior brief.
court remanded

and awarded costs to appellant
RELIEF SOUGHT

Respondent seeks reargument of the issues herein,
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This

reversal of this court's decision and affirmance of the
lower court's decision; or, if necessary, an opportunity
to file the record herein and submit a further brief based
on that record.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts relevant to this case are in part as stated
by this court in its opinion, with some notable exceptions
and additions as will be noted here and in the arguments to
follow.
Simply stated, the subject of this lawsuit is a Uniform
Real Estate Contract, originally between appellant as seller,
and defendant Coon, as buyer.

The interest of defendant

Coon was assigned to respondent, TCH, on February 20, 19 74.
That assignment of contract recited a specific balance due
on the contract.

After receiving notice of said assignment,

appellant informed respondent that the recited balance was
incorrect and thereafter refused to accept the required
monthly payments from respondent.

Appellant thereafter

brought suit, after mailing or serving notices for unlawful
detainer, alleging a failure to make the required monthly
payments from and since February of 1974.

Respondent counter-

claimed for an accounting of all sums paid and received
under the contract.
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ARGUMENT
I
THE COURT'S DECISION HEREIN IS IMPROPERLY BASED ON THE
RECORD OF THE LOWER COURT WHICH WAS NEVER FILED HEREIN AND
THEREFORE, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN REFERRED TO
The court, in considering the appeal herein, had before
it the briefs of the parties and the judgment of the lower
court, rendered after cross-motions for summary judgement.
No record was ever designated or filed herein.

By rudimentary

principles of appellate review, the court herein is limited
solely to those parts of the record designated and filed by
the parties. 4 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and Error §491; Bagnall v.
Suburbia Land Company, 542 P.2d 183 (Utah 1975).

In Bagnall,

only a partial record was filed, and that part was seldom
referred to in the briefs submitted.

This court stated that

the absence of the record and lack of use of the record to
substantiate the parties' contentions was "an apparent
invitation that we perform their procedural obligation and
conduct their research," but stated that "we cannot indulge
them such luxury under the circumstances here."

542 P.2d at

184.
In this case, because of the failure of appellant to
designate or file any part of the record, this court should
have limited its review solely to the judgment roll.

See

In Re Lavell's Estate, 122 Utah 2d 253, 248 P.2d 372 (1952);
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U.S. Building and Loan Ass'n. v. Midvale Home Finance Corp.
86 Utah 506,44 P.2d 1090 (1935); Bagnall, op. cit.
It is obvious that this rule of appellate review was
not honored herein, as the court's decision to remand cites
at great length matters to be found exclusively in the
record which was not filed, and, therefore, not available to
this court. So far as can be determined by respondent's
counsel, this is the first and only case where the Utah
Supreme Court has undertaken the burden of obtaining and
examining the record which has not been filed by appellant
in accordance with the requirements of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, and has contravened its own precedent of
presuming, in such cases "that the trial court's findings
were supported by competent and substantial evidence."
Sawyers v. Sawyers, 558 P.2d 607 (Utah 1976).

Such a

perusal and use of the unfiled record is obviously improper
and makes a mockery of the rules under which this court
conducts it proceedings.
II
THE DECISION OF THIS COURT IS NOT CONSISTENT WITH ITS
OWN PRESDENT WHICH HOLD THAT IN CASES ON APPEAL WHERE NO
RECORD IS FILED WITH THE APPELLATE COURT THE DECISION OF THE
LOWER COURT MUST BE AFFIRMED.
Respondent's prior brief cites several cases for the
proposition that if no record is filed on appeal, the court
must affirm the lower court's decision.
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Also cited was

4 Am Jur. 2d, which states that this is the rule not only in
Utah, but throughout the country.

Counsel for respondent

was unable to discover any cases in this jurisdiciton or any
other, which hold to the contrary view or indeed, which even
intimate that there may be any circumstances which would
dictate a different result.
The court's decision herein did not even refer to the
above-cited principle, although it was the major argument of
respondent for affirmance, and oft-cited rule of this court
and seemingly, binding precedent.
The most recent case cited by respondent in its brief
was Bagnal, op. cit., which was decided in 19 75.

However,

this issue has received further attention much more recently.
On December 13, 1976, in Sawyer v. Sawyer 558 P.2d 607,
(Utah 1976), the defendant appealed pro se, but failed to
provide a record on appeal.

This court affirmed stating

that because of said failure, it had no choice but to presume that the decision of the lower court was upported by
competent and substantial evidence.
Again, as recently as January 19, 1977, this court,
again affirmed the lower court's decision, when and because,
no record was filed.

American Nat'l. Mortgage, Inc. vs. Bowen

(Case No. 14473, unreported)
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Respondent finds it difficult to believe that the court
would now reverse itself on this issue, and urges it to
reconsider.
Ill
THE RECORD OF THE LOWER COURT PROCEEDINGS, IF AVAILABLE
HEREIN, WOULD DEMONSTRATE THAT THERE WERE NO MATERIAL ISSUES
OF FACT LEFT UNRESOLVED.
The decision appealed from herein, was rendered pursuant
to respondent's motion for partial summary judgment and
appellant's cross motion for summary judgment.

These motions

were made and considered only after extensive discovery had
been completed.

The purpose of respondent's discovery was

to establish certain crucial facts as uncontroverted.

This

purpose, respondent contends, was accomplished to the
extent necessary for the issuance of summary judgment.
Before discussing the facts established in the lower
court, it would be useful to outline the exact nature of the
issues presented both in the pleadings and in the cross
motions for summary judgment.

Appellant's complaint alleged

breach of the Uniform Real Estate Contract solely because of
a failure by defendants to make the required monthly payments.
There was no allegation of breach for failure to pay taxes
or insurance, or anything else, as is implied in this court's
decision.

Whether or not the alleged breach had occured was

the first issue presented to the lower court.
The other issue presented was raised by respondent's
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counterclaim seeking an accounting of all sums paid and
received pursuant to the contract.
Facts relevant to the first issue were established by
appellant's response to respondent's Interrogatories and
Requests for Admissions.
1.

These facts include the following:

The complaint alleged that the default in monthly

payments occurred as of February of 1974.
2.

Payments were made by defendants and accepted by

appellant through March of 1977.
3.

Subsequent monthly payments were tendered by check

to appellant and were refused.
4.

Reasons given by appellant for her refusal of

tender were that the checks were not legal tender and one of
the following reasons: the balance claimed on the contract
at the time of assignment between the defendants was incorrect,
the assignment was invalid or the contract was unenforceable.
5.

Respondent requested an accounting from appellant

of the correct balance and of sums received and paid by
appellant pursuant to the contract.
6.

Appellant did not provide the aforesaid accounting

requested by respondent until after the filing of the lawsuit
and in response to respondent's interrogatories.
7.

Defendants received the two notices.

8.

Respondent offered to make the required monthly

payments in any medium desired by appellant.
9.

Appellant failed to specify an acceptable medium.
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10.

Respondent was ready and willing at all time to

transmit the accrued monthly payments to appellant.
From the above undisputed facts, the district court
found, as a matter of law, that appellant had wrongfully
refused respondent's tender of payments and that therefore,
there had been no default by reason of failure to make
monthly payments as alleged in the complaint.
On the second issue, the parties submitted accountings
of monies paid and received, amortization schedules, cancelled checks, receipts, and affidavits.

The documents

disclosed several extra payments by Mr. Coon which had not
been credited by appellant.
admitted by appellant.

These payments were finally

A final reconciliation of taxes paid

by Mrs. Smith and extra payments made by Mr. Coon resulted
in the conclusion that payment to appellant of $30.55 would
reimburse her for all unpaid net taxes.

A careful scrutiny

of the record below would support that decision and reveal
that some of the statements rendered in the decision herein
are not completely accurate or are not relevant to the
issues presented.
For example, the decision states that Mr. Coon, a
defendant below, is the respondent herein.

In fact, he died

during the proceedings and the court declined to name an
administrator herein, finding that the assignment between
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the parties was valid and that he had left no estate.

The

only respondent herein is Twentieth Century Housing.
Also, as another example, the 10-day notice referred to
in the court's decision, referred to the monthly $60.00
payments, not taxes and insurance.

All monthly payments

were paid or tendered throughout the term of the contract.
IV
IF THE COURT HEREIN IS NOW GOING TO REVERSE ITS OWN
WELL-ESTABLISHED PRECEDENT, RESPONDENT SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO
FILE THE RECORD ON APPEAL AND SUBMIT AN ADDITIONAL BRIEF
BASED ON THAT RECORD TO DEMONSTRATE THE VALIDITY OF THE
LOWER COURT'S DECISION.
Respondent urges the court to keep in mind the nature
of this lawsuit and what transpired prior to the filing of
the appeal.

Respondent, as assignee on the Uniform Real

Estate Contract, made every attempt to comply with its
obligations under that contract.

Having only the figures

and accountings provided by the assignors, Mr. and Mrs.
Coon, and being informed by Mrs. Smith, the appellant, that
those figures were inaccurate and the balance as represented
by the Coons wrong, it repeatedly requested that Mrs. Smith
supply it with the proper balance and the accounting to
support that figure.

Mrs. Smith refused to do so.

of respondent's payments were refused.

Then all

Respondent is a

business enterprises accustomed, as are most businesses, to
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conducting its financial transactions by check or similar
medium.

However, in an effort to avoid litigation, respondent

offered to pay appellant in any medium she desired, if she
would only specify that medium.

Appellant did not even

bother to respond to that request.

Suit was filed and

respondent attempted to resolve the issues as expeditiously
and clearly as possible.

An accounting was finally obtained

from appellant, whereafter she admitted its inaccuracies.
All of this entailed a great deal of time and money expended
for legal fees by respondent.

The problems could have been

resolved without a lawsuit had appellant simply provided the
requested information when asked to, shortly after the
assignment of contract in 1974.

Respondent demonstrated at

many times, its willingness to amicably resolve the difference
and compare the figures, if they had been provided.
refused to act in any kind of reasonable manner.

Appellant

Instead,

she refused payments, refused to provide needed information,
alleged all manners of problems which were not alleged in
the lawsuit and filed suit against the defendants.
Now, this court has directed that this case be remanded
for further proceedings in the lower court, meaning further
expense and time for respondent in a case which should not
and need not have ever been filed.
In filing its brief herein, respondent relied on this
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court's prior decisions which consistently held that in
those instances where no record was filed, the decision of
the lower court would be affirmed*

If this court now intends

to reverse that long standing precedent, respondent contends
that it would only be equitable to allow it to file the
record herein, and drawing from that record, present its
case in detail to this court.
CONCLUSION
In this case where no record was filed on appeal this
court improperly sought out and utilized that record in
arriving at its decision and declined to affirm the decision
of the lower court.

These acts are in direct conflict with

the established precedent of this court and others, which
precludes examination of and reliance upon an unfiled record
in renduring an appellate decision, and mandates affirmance
in the absence of a record having been filed. If this court
now intends to reverse itself in this manner with no prior
notice, it would be only equitable to allow respondent to
file the record and submit an additional brief, wherein it
would be obvious that there were no material issues of fact
and that the lower court was correct in its determinations.
Respectfully submitted,

Pamela R. Taggart'-"
ROE AND FOWLER
340 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
Mailed two copies of the foregoing Respondent's Brief,
postage prepaid, this

^? 7

day of June, 1977, to

Verna R. Smith, 906 South 19th East, Salt Lake City, Utah
84108, acting pro se for plaintiff-appellant.
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